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Introduction & Background 
In the last two years, more than 200 papers have been written on how machine learning (ML) can fail because of adversarial attacks on the algorithms and 
data; this number balloons if we were to incorporate papers covering non-adversarial failure modes. The spate of papers has made it difficult for ML 
practitioners, let alone engineers, lawyers, and policymakers, to keep up with the attacks against and defenses of ML systems.  However, as these systems 
become more pervasive, the need to understand how they fail, whether by the hand of an adversary or due to the inherent design of a system, will only 
become more pressing. The purpose of this document is to jointly tabulate both of these failure modes in a single place.  
◼ Intentional failures where the failure is caused by an active adversary attempting to subvert the system to attain her goals – either to misclassify the 
result, infer private training data, or to steal the underlying algorithm.  
◼ Unintentional failures where the failure is because an ML system produces a formally correct but completely unsafe outcome 
We would like to point out that there are other taxonomies and frameworks that individually highlight intentional failure modes1,2 and unintentional failure 
modes.3,4   Our classification brings the two separate failure modes together in one place and addresses the following needs:  
1) The need to equip software developers, security incident responders, lawyers, and policy makers with a common vernacular to talk about this problem. 
After developing the initial version of the taxonomy last year, we worked with security and ML teams across Microsoft, 23 external partners, standards 
organization, and governments to understand how stakeholders would use our framework. Based on this usability study and stakeholder feedback, 
we iterated on the framework.  
Result: When presented with an ML failure mode, we frequently observed that software developers and lawyers mentally mapped the ML failure 
modes to traditional software attacks like data exfiltration. So, throughout the paper, we attempt to highlight how machine learning failure modes are 
meaningfully different from traditional software failures from a technology and policy perspective. 
2) The need for a common platform for engineers to build on top of and to integrate into their existing software development and security practices. 
Broadly, we wanted the taxonomy to be more than an educational tool – we want it to effectuate tangible engineering outcomes.  
 
1 Li, Guofu, et al. "Security Matters: A Survey on Adversarial Machine Learning." arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.07339 (2018). 
2 Chakraborty, Anirban, et al. "Adversarial attacks and defences: A survey." arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.00069 (2018). 
3 Ortega, Pedro, and Vishal Maini. "Building safe artificial intelligence: specification, robustness, and assurance." DeepMind Safety Research Blog (2018). 
4 Amodei, Dario, et al. "Concrete problems in AI safety." arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.06565 (2016). 
  
Result: Using this taxonomy as a lens, Microsoft modified its software development lifecycle process for its entire organization. Specifically, all 
engineers in Microsoft building ML systems now have a threat model to ascertain threats to their ML systems before deploying it in production and 
also security incident responders have a  standard process for classifying ML vulnerabilities that have been discovered  
3) The need for a common vocabulary to describe these attacks amongst policymakers and lawyers. We believe that this  for describing different ML 
failure modes and analysis of how their harms might be regulated is a meaningful first step towards informed policy. 
Result:  This taxonomy is written for a wide interdisciplinary audience – so, policymakers who are looking at the issues from a general ML/AI 
perspective, as well as specific domains such as misinformation/healthcare should find the failure mode catalogue useful. We also highlight any 
applicable legal interventions to address the failure modes.  
How to use this document?   
At the outset, we acknowledge that this is a living document. Since this is an active area of research, the document may not be complete; as the community 
discovers more failures modes, we will update the taxonomy. We also do not prescribe technological mitigations to these failure modes, as defenses are 
scenario specific and tie in with the threat model under consideration.   
For engineers, we recommend browsing through the overview of possible failure modes and jumping into the threat model document. This way, engineers 
can identify threats, attacks and vulnerabilities and then use the framework to plan for countermeasures where available. We then refer you to the bug bar 
that maps these new vulnerabilities in the taxonomy alongside traditional software vulnerabilities, and provides a rating for each ML vulnerability (such as 
critical, important). This bug bar can be easily integrated with existing incident response process, triggering similar playbooks  
For lawyers and policy makers, this document organizes ML failure modes into a framework to allow for analysis of key issues relevant for anyone exploring 
policy options, such as the work done here.5,6  Specifically, we have categorized failures and consequences so that policy makers can begin to draw distinctions 
between causes which will in turn inform public policy initiatives to promote ML safety and security.  We hope that policy makers will use these categories 
begin to flesh out how existing legal regimes may (not) adequately capture emerging issues, what historical legal regimes or policy solutions might have dealt 
with similar harms, and where we should be especially sensitive to civil liberties issues.    
Structure of the document  
In both the Intentional Failure Modes and Unintentional Failure Modes section, we provide a brief definition of the attack, and illustrative example from the 
literature.  
In the Intentional Failure Modes section, we provide the additional fields:  
1) What does the attack attempt to compromise in the ML system – Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability? We define Confidentiality as assuring that 
the components of the ML system (data, algorithm, model) are accessible only by authorized parties; Integrity is defined as assuring that the ML system 
 
5 Shankar Siva Kumar, Ram, et al. "Law and Adversarial Machine Learning." arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.10731 (2018). 
6 Calo, Ryan, et al. "Is Tricking a Robot Hacking?." University of Washington School of Law Research Paper 2018-05 (2018). 
  
can be modified only by authorized parties; Availability is defined as an assurance that the ML system is accessible to authorized parties. Together, 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability is called the CIA triad. For each intentional failure mode, we attempt to identify which of the CIA triad is 
compromised.  
2) How much knowledge is required to mount this attack – blackbox or whitebox? In Blackbox style attacks., the attacker does NOT have direct access 
to the training data, no knowledge of the ML algorithm used and no access to the source code of the model. The attacker only queries the model and 
observes the response. In a whitebox style attack the attacker has knowledge of either ML algorithm or access to the model source code.   
3) Commentary on if the attacker is violating traditional technological notion of access/authorization.  
Summary 
 
Intentionally Motivated Failures 
S.no Attack Overview Violates traditional 
technological notion of 
access/authorization? 
1 Perturbation attack  Attacker modifies the query to get appropriate response No 
2 Poisoning attack  Attacker contaminates the training phase of ML systems to get intended result No 
3 Model Inversion Attacker recovers the secret features used in the model by through careful queries No 
4 Membership Inference Attacker can infer if given data record was part of the model’s training dataset or not No 
5 Model Stealing Attacker is able to recover the model by constructing careful queries  No 
6 Reprogramming ML system Repurpose the ML system to perform an activity it was not programmed for No 
7 Adversarial Example in Physical 
Domain  
Attacker brings adversarial examples into physical domain to subvert ML system e.g: 3d 
printing special eyewear to fool facial recognition system 
No 
8 Malicious ML provider recovering 
training data  
Malicious ML provider can query the model used by customer and recover customer’s 
training data  
Yes 
9 Attacking the ML supply chain Attacker compromises the ML models as it is being downloaded for use Yes 
10 Backdoor ML  Malicious ML provider backdoors algorithm that doesn’t work unless triggered Yes 
11 Exploit Software Dependencies Attacker uses traditional software exploits like buffer overflow to confuse ML systems Yes 
 
 
Unintended Failures 
S.no Failure Overview 
1 Reward Hacking Reinforcement Learning (RL) systems act in unintended ways because of mismatch between stated reward and true 
reward 
2 Side Effects RL system disrupts the environment as it tries to attain its goal  
  
3 Distributional shifts The system is tested in one kind of environment, but is unable to adapt to changes in other kinds of environment  
4 Natural Adversarial Examples  Without attacker perturbations, the ML system fails owing to hard negative mining  
5 Common Corruption  The system is not able to handle common corruptions and perturbations such as tilting, zooming, or noisy images.  
6 Incomplete Testing  The ML system is not tested in realistic conditions that it is meant to operate in.  
 
 
Part I: Intentionally Motivated Failures 
S.No Attack Class  What  Compromises Scenario Is the attacker [technologically] misusing 
the system?    
1  Perturbation 
attacks  
In perturbation style 
attacks, the attacker 
stealthily modifies the 
query to get a desired 
response 
 
ML-Integrity  
 
 
Image: Noise is added to an X-ray 
image, which makes the 
predictions go from normal scan to 
abnormal. 7 
[Blackbox] 
 
 
 
Text translation: Specific characters 
are manipulated to result in 
incorrect translation. The attack 
can suppress specific word or can 
even remove the word completely.8 
[Blackbox and Whitebox] 
 
Speech: Researchers showed how 
given a speech waveform, another 
waveform can be exactly replicated 
but transcribes into a totally 
different text.9 [Whitebox but may 
be extended to Blackbox] 
 
Technologically, it feels like the attacker 
is not misusing the system  
 
- In a blackbox setting, no special 
privileges are required by the 
attacker to perform the attack. 
The attacker generates the 
perturbations offline, and queries 
the system legitimately.  
 
- There seems to be no 
technological access violations – 
Just like a legitimate user sends 
in a legitimate image, the 
attacker sends in a corrupted 
image for classification to 
purposely confuse the system.    
 
 
 
7 Paschali, Magdalini, et al. "Generalizability vs. Robustness: Adversarial Examples for Medical Imaging." arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.00504 (2018). 
8 Ebrahimi, Javid, Daniel Lowd, and Dejing Dou. "On Adversarial Examples for Character-Level Neural Machine Translation." arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.09030 (2018) 
9 Carlini, Nicholas, and David Wagner. "Audio adversarial examples: Targeted attacks on speech-to-text." arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.01944 (2018). 
  
2 Poisoning attacks   The goal of the attacker 
is to contaminate the 
machine model 
generated in the training 
phase, so that 
predictions on new data 
will be modified in the 
testing phase. 
 
Targeted: In targeted 
poisoning attacks, the 
attacker wants to 
misclassify specific 
examples.  
 
Indiscriminate: The aim 
here is to cause DoS like 
effect, which makes the 
system.  
ML-Integrity In a medical dataset where the goal 
is to predict the dosage of 
anticoagulant drug Warfarin using 
demographic information, etc. 
Researchers introduced malicious 
samples at 8% poisoning rate, 
which changed dosage by 75.06% 
for half of patients.10 [Blackbox] 
 
In Tay, future conversations were 
tainted because a fraction of the 
past conversations were used to 
train the system via feedback.11 
[Blackbox] 
 
Technologically, it feels like the attacker 
is not misusing the system  
 
- No special privileges required by 
the attacker. In a closed system 
like Twitter (where Tay, the 
tweetbot was corrupted), the 
attacker needs to be a user of the 
platform.   
 
- No technological access violation 
– The authorized attacker sends 
chaff traffic to the endpoint, just 
like an authorized user would 
send legitimate traffic to the end 
point.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Model Inversion   The private features 
used in machine learning 
models can be 
recovered.  
ML – Confidentiality  Researchers12 were able to recover 
private training data used to train 
the algorithm. The authors were 
able to reconstruct faces, by just 
the name and access to the model 
to the point where workers on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk could use 
the photo to identify an individual 
from a line-up with 95% accuracy.  
 
Technologically, it feels like the attacker 
is not misusing the system  
 
- No special privileges are required 
by the attacker to perform the 
attack.  
 
- There seems to be no 
technological access violations – 
Just like a legitimate user sends 
in a legitimate image, the 
 
10 Jagielski, Matthew, et al. "Manipulating machine learning: Poisoning attacks and countermeasures for regression learning." arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.00308 (2018)  
11 https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2016/03/25/learning-tays-introduction/  
12 Fredrikson M, Jha S, Ristenpart T. 2015. Model inversion attacks that exploit confidence information and basic countermeasures 
  
In the same paper, the authors 
showed how they were able to 
extract specific information. 
Verbatim from 12 
 
“In May 2014, Walt Hickey wrote 
an article for FiveThirtyEight’s 
DataLab section that attempted a 
statistical analysis of the 
connection between peoples’ steak 
preparation preferences and their 
propensity for risk-taking 
behaviors. To support the analysis, 
FiveThirtyEight commissioned a 
survey of 553 individuals from 
SurveyMonkey, which collected 
responses to questions such as: “Do 
you ever smoke cigarettes?”, “Have 
you ever cheated on your 
significant other?”, and of course, 
“How do you like your steak 
prepared?”. Demographic 
characteristics such as age, gender, 
household income, education, and 
census region were also collected. 
We discarded rows that did not 
contain responses for the infidelity 
question or the steak preparation 
question, resulting in a total of 332 
rows for the inversion experiments. 
We used model inversion on the 
decision tree learned from this 
dataset to infer whether each 
participant responded “Yes” to the 
question about infidelity” 
 
[Whitebox and Blackbox] 
attacker sends these specially 
crafted queries to recover the 
private features.  
 
 
 
  
  
 
4 Membership 
Inference attack 
The attacker can 
determine whether a 
given data record was 
part of the model’s 
training dataset or not. 
ML – Confidentiality  Researchers were able to predict a 
patient’s main procedure (e.g: 
Surgery the patient went through) 
based on the attributes (e.g: age, 
gender, hospital)13 
[Blackbox] 
Technologically, it feels like the attacker 
is not misusing the system  
 
- No special privileges are required 
by the attacker to perform the 
attack.  
 
- There seems to be no 
technological access violations – 
Just like a legitimate user sends 
in a legitimate image, the 
attacker sends these specially 
crafted queries to infer 
membership.   
 
  
5 Model stealing  The attackers recreate 
the underlying model by 
legitimately querying the 
model. The functionality 
of the new model is 
same as that of the 
underlying model.  
ML-Confidentiality Researchers successfully emulated 
the underlying algorithm from 
Amazon, BigML. For instance, in the 
BigML case, researchers were able 
to recover the model used to 
predict if someone should have a 
good/bad credit risk (German 
Credit Card dataset) using 1,150 
queries and within 10 minutes14 
Technologically, it feels like the attacker 
is not misusing the system  
 
- No special privileges are required 
by the attacker to perform the 
attack.  
 
- There seems to be no 
technological access violations – 
Just like a legitimate user sends 
in a legitimate image, the 
attacker sends these specially 
crafted queries to confuse the 
system  
 
 
 
13 Shokri R, Stronati M, Song C, Shmatikov V. 2017. Membership inference attacks against machine learning models. In Proc. of the 2017 IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy 
(SP), San Jose, CA, 22–24 May 2017, pp. 3–18. New York, NY: IEEE. 
14 Tramèr, Florian, et al. "Stealing Machine Learning Models via Prediction APIs." USENIX Security Symposium. 2016. 
  
6 Reprogramming 
deep neural nets 
By means of a specially 
crafted query from an 
adversary, machine 
learning systems can be 
reprogrammed to a task. 
that deviates from the 
creator’s original intent. 
ML – Integrity, ML-
Availability 
Demonstrated how ImageNet, a 
system used to classify one of 
several categories of images was 
repurposed to count squares. 
Authors end the paper with a 
hypothetical scenario: An attacker 
sends Captcha images to the 
computer vision classifier in a cloud 
hosted photos service to solve the 
image captchas to create spam 
accounts.15 
 
 
Technologically, it feels like the attacker 
is not misusing the system  
 
- No special privileges are required 
by the attacker to perform the 
attack.  
 
- There seems to be no 
technological access violations – 
Just like a legitimate user sends 
in a legitimate image, the 
attacker sends these specially 
crafted queries to reprogram the 
system  
 
7 Adversarial 
Example in the 
physical domain  
An adversarial example is 
an input/query from a 
malicious entity sent 
with the sole aim of 
misleading the machine 
learning system. These 
examples can manifest in 
the physical domain. 
ML - Integrity Researchers 3D prints a rifle with 
custom texture that fools image 
recognition system into thinking it 
is a turtle16 
 
Researchers construct a sunglass 
with a design that can now fool 
image recognition system, and no 
longer recognize the faces 
correctly17 
See analysis above. 
8 Malicious ML 
providers who 
can recover 
training data 
Malicious ML provider 
can query the model 
used by customer and 
recover customer’s 
training data. 
ML – Confidentiality  Researchers show how a malicious 
provider presents a backdoored 
algorithm, wherein the private 
training data is recovered. They 
were able to reconstruct faces and 
texts, given the model alone.  18 
 
A trusted party (the provider) is misusing 
their access in order to cause harm. 
 
However, depending on contractual 
agreements between a provider and 
user, there may or may not actually be an 
access or authorization problem. 
 
15 Elsayed, Gamaleldin F., Ian Goodfellow, and Jascha Sohl-Dickstein. "Adversarial Reprogramming of Neural Networks." arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.11146 (2018).  
16 Athalye, Anish, and Ilya Sutskever. "Synthesizing robust adversarial examples." arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.07397(2017)  
17 Sharif, Mahmood, et al. "Adversarial Generative Nets: Neural Network Attacks on State-of-the-Art Face Recognition." arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.00349 (2017).  
 
  
9 Attacking the ML 
Supply Chain19 
Owing to large resources 
(data + computation) 
required to train 
algorithms, the current 
practice is to reuse 
models trained by large 
corporations, and modify 
them slightly for task at 
hand (e.g: ResNet is a 
popular image 
recognition model from 
Microsoft). These models 
are curated in a Model 
Zoo (for example, Caffe 
hosts popular image 
recognition models). In 
this attack, the adversary 
attacks the models 
hosted in Caffe, thereby 
poisoning the well for 
anyone else.  
ML - Integrity Researchers show how it is possible 
for an attacker to check in 
malicious code into one of the 
popular model. An unsuspecting 
ML developer downloads this 
model and uses it as part of the 
image recognition system in their 
code. 20 The authors show how in 
Caffe, there exists a model whose 
SHA1 hash does NOT match the 
authors’ digest, indicating 
tampering. There are 22 models 
without any SHA1 hash for integrity 
checks at all.  
A trusted party (the attacker contributing 
code) is misusing their access in order to 
cause harm. 
 
- Injecting malicious code into 
source repository feels like a 
technological violation. However, 
it may not map well onto existing 
legal regimes. 
 
 
Questions:  
 
1. Are model repositories (typically 
open source) failing their duty of 
care if they don’t check for 
adversarial manipulation of the 
models they host?  
 
2. Can the adversary who tampered 
with the models be punished 
under CFAA?  
 
3. Is the unsuspecting developer 
now liable for any damages 
incurred by her/his/their 
customer?  
 
10 Backdoor 
Machine Learning 
Like in the “Attacking the 
ML Supply Chain”, In this 
attack scenario, the 
training process is either 
fully or partially 
outsourced 
ML – Confidentiality, 
ML-Integrity 
Researchers created a backdoored 
U.S. street sign classifier that 
identifies stop signs as speed limits 
only when a special sticker is added 
to the stop sign (backdoor trigger). 
20 
A trusted party is misusing their access in 
order to cause harm. However, it may not 
map well onto existing legal regimes and 
may depend on the contractual 
relationship between the malicious party 
 
19 Xiao, Qixue, et al. "Security Risks in Deep Learning Implementations." arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.11008 (2017). 
20 Gu, Tianyu, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, and Siddharth Garg. "Badnets: Identifying vulnerabilities in the machine learning model supply chain." arXiv preprint 
arXiv:1708.06733 (2017) 
  
to a malicious party who 
wants to provide the 
user with 
a trained model that 
contains a backdoor. The 
backdoored model 
would perform well on 
most inputs (including 
inputs 
that the end user may 
hold out as a validation 
set) but cause 
targeted 
misclassifications or 
degrade the accuracy of 
the 
model for inputs that 
satisfy some secret, 
attacker-chosen 
property, which we will 
refer to as the backdoor 
trigger. 
 
They are now extending this work 
to text processing systems, wherein 
specific words are replaced with 
the trigger being the speaker’s 
accent.21  
owning the training process and the 
people who commission the model. 
 
 
11 Exploit software 
dependencies of 
ML system 
In this attack, the 
attacker does NOT 
manipulate the 
algorithms. Instead, 
exploits the software 
vulnerabilities such as a 
buffer overflow within 
dependencies of the 
system. 
ML- Confidentiality, 
ML – Integrity, ML-
Availability  
An adversary sends in corrupt input 
to an image recognition system 
that causes it to misclassify by 
exploiting a software bug in one of 
the dependencies.3 
 
A trusted party is misusing their access in 
order to cause harm.  
 
 
 
 
21 https://www.wired.com/story/machine-learning-backdoors/  
  
 
Part II: Unintended Failure Modes  
S.no  Attack Class  What  Compromises Scenario 
1 Reward Hacking Reinforcement learning 
(RL) systems act in 
unintended ways 
because of 
discrepancies between 
the specified reward 
and the true intended 
reward. 
Safety of the system  A huge corpus of gaming examples in AI has been compiled.22   
2 Side Effects RL system disrupts the 
environment as it tries 
to attain their goal  
Safety of the system  Scenario, verbatim from the authors in 23: “Suppose a designer wants 
an RL agent (for example our cleaning robot) to achieve some goal, 
like moving a box from one side of a room to the other. Sometimes 
the most effective way to achieve the goal involves doing something 
unrelated and destructive to the rest of the environment, like knocking 
over a vase of water that is in its path. If the agent is given reward 
only for moving the box, it will probably knock over the vase.” 
3 Distributional 
shifts 
The system is tested in 
one kind of 
environment, but is 
unable to adapt to 
changes in other kinds 
of environment  
Safety of the system Researchers trained two state of the art RL agents, Rainbow DQN and 
A2C in a simulation to avoid lava. During training, the RL agent was 
able to avoid lava successfully and reach its goal. During testing, they 
slightly moved the position of the lava, but the RL agent was not able 
to avoid  24 
4 Natural 
Adversarial 
Examples  
The system 
misrecognizes an input 
that was found using 
hard negative mining  
Safety of the system Here the authors show how by a simple process of hard negative 
mining25, it is possible to confuse the ML system by relaying the 
example.  
 
22 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/e/2PACX-1vRPiprOaC3HsCf5Tuum8bRfzYUiKLRqJmbOoC-32JorNdfyTiRRsR7Ea5eWtvsWzuxo8bjOxCG84dAg/pubhtml 
23 Amodei, Dario, et al. "Concrete problems in AI safety." arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.06565 (2016).  
24 Leike, Jan, et al. "AI safety gridworlds." arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.09883 (2017).  
25 Gilmer, Justin, et al. "Motivating the rules of the game for adversarial example research." arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.06732 (2018). 
  
5 Common 
Corruption 
The system is not able 
to handle common 
corruptions and 
perturbations such as 
tilting, zooming, or 
noisy images.  
Safety of the system The authors show how common corruptions such as changes to 
brightness, contrast, fog or noise added to images have a significant 
drop in metrics in image recognition.26 
6 Incomplete 
Testing in 
Realistic 
conditions 
The ML system is not 
tested in realistic 
conditions that it is 
meant to operate in. 
Safety of the system The authors highlight that that while defenders commonly account 
for robustness of the ML algorithm, they lose sight of realistic 
conditions. For instance, they argue that a missing stop sign knocked 
off in the wind (which is more realistic) than an attacker attempting 
to perturb the model.25 
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